| 2022-10 |
The problem of mixed beings |
Philosophical Studies
|
| 2022-07 |
Entitlement, generosity, relativism, and structure-internal goods |
METAPHILOSOPHY
|
| 2021-04 |
The Paradox of Conceptualizability |
PHILOSOPHIA
|
| 2020-10 |
Moderate truth pluralism and the structure of doxastic normativity |
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
|
| 2020-10 |
Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism |
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
|
| 2020-06 |
On Moderate Pluralism About Truth and Logic |
PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM
|
| 2020-04 |
Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement |
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
|
| 2020-03 |
Preface to Special Issue Logical Pluralism and Normativity |
INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
|
| 2020-03 |
On the normative variability of truth and logic |
INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
|
| 2018-07 |
Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism |
SYNTHESE
|
| 2016-01 |
Truth Pluralism |
Oxford Handbook of Truth
|
| 2014-10 |
ALL THE (MANY, MANY) THINGS WE KNOW: EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE |
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
|
| 2014-07 |
On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance |
SYNTHESE
|
| 2014-06 |
Rational Trust |
SYNTHESE
|
| 2014-03 |
Pluralism x 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics |
ERKENNTNIS
|
| 2013-09 |
The epistemology of absence-based inference |
SYNTHESE
|
| 2013-05 |
The epistemology of inclusiveness |
SYNTHESE
|
| 2012-07 |
Recent work on alethic pluralism |
ANALYSIS
|
| 2012-03 |
Pluralist Theories of Truth |
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
|
| 2012-03 |
True Alethic Functionalism? |
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
|
| 2011-09 |
TRUTH AS ONE(S) AND MANY: ON LYNCH’S ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM |
Analytic Philosophy
|
| 2010-06 |
Open-endedness, Schemas and Ontological Commitment |
Nous
|
| 2010-01 |
STABILIZING ALETHIC PLURALISM |
Philosophical Quarterly
|
| 2009-12 |
Entitlement, value and rationality |
Synthese
|
| 2009-09 |
Solving the Caesar Problem Without Categorical Sortals |
Erkenntnis
|
| 2006-01 |
What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? |
MONIST
|